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REMARKS
COMMENTS ON FORUM NON CONVENIENS
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL CASES
By BERNARD H. OxMAN*
The excellent papers presented here today review a wide
range of conceptual and practical issues regarding the application
of the rules of forum non conveniens in international cases. A
number devote particular attention, in very useful detail, to the
problems posed when it is asserted in a U.S. court that a Latin
American forum would be more convenient.'
In this brief comment, I would propose to step back from the
immediate issues addressed in those papers and take a look at
some underlying international law questions and problems of sys-
tem coordination that are pertinent to a fair number of the papers.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
I begin with certain basic premises of international law. Cus-
tomary international law does not - or at the very least does not
ordinarily - dictate the decisions of a state regarding which civil
cases it courts will and will not hear. The most obvious manifesta-
tion of this premise is that rules regarding access to and the
authority of courts differ. Disputes between states regarding the
exercise of jurisdiction in civil cases typically involve assertions
that a state (or its court) has exceeded its jurisdiction, not that it
has breached an international duty by failing to hear a case. I am
aware of no rule of customary international law to the effect that
plaintiffs choice of forum must be honored or extinguishes the
jurisdiction of other courts.
The right to determine access to its courts is a right unques-
tionably enjoyed by a Latin American state. It is also a right
unquestionably enjoyed by the United States. Neither can force a
civil case into the courts of the other against its will. And while
* Bernard H. Oxman, Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. See Alejandro M. Garro, Forum Non Conveniens: "Availability" and
"Adequacy" of Latin American fora from a Comparative Perspective, 35 U. MiAi
INTER-AM. L. REV. 65 (2004); Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin
America and Blocking Statutes, id. at 21.
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some of the papers come close to suggesting otherwise,2 as far as I
know no U.S. court has ever tried to do that. A dismissal on forum
non conveniens grounds is just that; it is not a transfer of a case.
A provisional or conditional dismissal does not force a plain-
tiff or a foreign court to do anything;3 it simply indicates that the
forum may reconsider the dismissal under certain conditions. To
take a simple example, a dismissal conditional on the defendant
waiving objections based on rules of prescription or statues of limi-
tation in a foreign court does not compel the foreign court to hear
the case if it regards those rules as mandatory non-waivable limi-
tations on its powers. Moreover, the practical problems of coordi-
nation that provisional or conditional dismissals may pose are not
entirely dissimilar to those sometimes encountered in the applica-
tion of doctrines of litis pendens that are more familiar to civil law
jurists.
Needless to say, treaties may alter the situation as among the
states parties. Where the matter is addressed explicitly, there is
little room for doubt that the treaty creates obligations that may
affect general rules regarding access to courts. But whether the
matter is or is not addressed explicitly, it is important that the
treaty be interpreted and applied properly. The Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, which is regarded as generally declar-
atory of customary international law on the subject, contains no
a priori rule that treaties are to be interpreted either strictly or
liberally. The basic rule set forth in Article 31 of the Vienna Con-
vention is that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accor-
dance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.
In this connection, it should be recognized that a treaty obli-
gation to give foreigners access to courts without discrimination,
such as that contained in bilateral treaties of friendship, com-
merce and navigation, ordinarily proceeds on the assumption that
the general rules of a state regarding access to its courts continue
to apply. For example, the Constitution and laws of the United
States do not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the federal
courts in diversity of citizenship cases where both the plaintiff and
the defendant are foreigners (subject to a special rule regarding
U.S. permanent residents).4 It would be far-fetched (and self-
defeating) to argue that this violates the treaty obligations of the
2. See Saint Dahl, supra note 1, at 25.
3. Compare id.
4. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, Sec. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
124
2003-2004]
United States. It is also far-fetched to argue that rules of forum
non conveniens that are routinely applied to U.S. litigants in the
courts of the states of the United States somehow deny fair or
equal treatment when the same rules are applied by federal or
state courts to foreign litigants. If anything, the papers presented
today can be read to suggest that many U.S. courts are more cau-
tious about granting forum non conveniens motions where the
more convenient court is asserted to be in a foreign country. Be
that as it may, the forum non conveniens inquiry turns on factual
contacts of parties, witnesses, and other evidence relevant to the
litigation; that may include domicile or residence, but it does not
- at least not ordinarily - turn on the nationality of the plaintiff
as such.5
Particular care needs to be taken in interpreting the general
language of treaties on questions of access to courts in the case of
a federal state like the United States where such matters are
often addressed by the laws of the several states of the United
States. The U.S. Senate is cautious about the effects of treaties on
the powers of the states of the United States, and it is not lightly
to be presumed that the President and the Senate, in accepting a
treaty obligation, intended to imply restrictions on the power of
the states of the United States to regulate access to their courts
where that is not reasonably evident from the text. Moreover, it
should be recognized that United States courts, like those in other
countries, are inclined to give considerable weight to the interpre-
tation of treaty obligations by the political branches; the Execu-
tive Branch in the U.S. is unlikely to be inclined to contend that a
significant limitation on the ordinary application of state and fed-
eral law regarding access to courts somehow emerges from very
general language of a treaty on access to courts. It should also be
recognized that the Supreme Court of the United States has
recently evidenced considerable concern about Congressional
encroachments on the rights of the states of the United States. It
would be ironic, and sad, if those who seek to strengthen respect
for international law in domestic litigation were, by virtue of
aggressive assertions of the effect of treaties on ordinary rules
regarding access to courts, to invite the Supreme Court, for the
5. In this connection it might be noted that while choice of law rules in the
United States rarely if ever turn on the nationality of the parties (as opposed to their
domicile or residence), such choice of law rules are not unknown in some civil law
countries. Do those rules entail violations of the general language of treaties on equal
access to courts?
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first time in its history, to declare a treaty unconstitutional on
grounds of invasion of the powers of the states.
Even if there is a pertinent treaty obligation, whether a court
is obliged to comply with the treaty obligation absent implement-
ing legislation is itself a matter of the municipal law of the state
concerned, not international law. States are required to take the
measures necessary to give effect to their treaty obligations; they
are not - or at the very least they are not ordinarily - required by
international law to give the treaty direct effect as municipal law.
And while scholars may question how one reconciles the distinc-
tion between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties with
the express language of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution,' that distinction was made by the U.S. Supreme Court
early in its history7 and continues to be applied.
SYSTEM COORDINATION
I have addressed these remarks to questions of the law gov-
erning access to courts, and have tried to limit the use of the
words competence and jurisdiction. The reason is that these words
can breed a great deal of conceptual confusion.
It is of course correct that the rules of forum non conveniens
are not characterized as jurisdictional in the United States;
indeed they proceed on the assumption that the court has jurisdic-
tion. But those rules are part of the law regarding access to the
courts. Either a state or the federal government could include
those rules in its jurisdictional statutes if it chose to do so. For
example, a fair number of the states of the United States now con-
fer jurisdiction on their courts to the extent not precluded by the
Constitution of the United States. Within those very broad limits,
those states have, by virtue of the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens, decided to delegate to their courts the question of when it
is, and is not, appropriate for a particular case to be tried in that
state. The legislatures need not have done so. They could have
included specific limitations in statutes that can be styled either
jurisdictional or something else.
It is also of more than passing interest that, for purposes of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution and its
general implementing statute,8 a dismissal on grounds of forum
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
7. Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
8. U.S. CONST. art. TV, Sec. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
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non conveniens is treated in the same way as a jurisdictional dis-
missal: it is not a final adjudication on the merits barring a new
action on the same claim in another forum. This may suggest that
forum non conveniens dismissals should be characterized gener-
ally in the same way as jurisdictional dismissals for private inter-
national law purposes even if they are not characterized as
jurisdictional for purposes of the local law of the forum.
Any refusal by a forum to hear a case can be said to compel
the plaintiff to bring the case elsewhere in the sense that the
plaintiffs only other option is to abandon the claim. If that is so,
then the expansive assertions regarding the unlawful effect of
such compulsion on the jurisdiction of a court in a civil law coun-
try9 should not be limited to dismissals by a foreign court on
grounds of forum non conveniens; logically they should apply with-
out distinction to procedural dismissals by another forum without
regard to the characterization of the procedural grounds for such a
dismissal under the law of that forum. That in turn raises ques-
tions regarding the soundness of the underlying argument that
forum non conveniens dismissals result in unlawful compulsion to
sue in another court. I am not an expert in civil law concepts of
judicial jurisdiction, but I must confess that I would be astonished
to learn that, because of such "compulsion," a court in a civil law
country would refuse to hear a case because it was dismissed by
the courts of another country on grounds such as lack of compe-
tence or lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
To be sure, international law does not - or at the least does
not ordinarily - compel the courts of one state to hear a case dis-
missed in another on procedural grounds. A state may keep its
courts open to cases dismissed on some grounds but not others.
But it makes little sense for that decision to turn on whether a
procedural dismissal is characterized as jurisdictional in the law
of the first state.
Similarly, international law does not - or at the least does
not ordinarily - require a state to hear a case simply because
there is no alternative forum. One obvious example is where the
forum has a long period of prescription or statute of limitations,
but declines to entertain the action because under its choice of law
rules it applies a shorter period specified in the law of some other
jurisdiction.
The fact that forum non conveniens law as articulated in the
9. See Garro, supra note 1, at 69-70; Saint Dahl, supra note 1, at 25.
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United States has, at least until recently, proceeded on the
assumption that an alternative forum will be open does not mean
that this must be so. There is no reason why a U.S. court should
be less resistant to Latin American states' attempts to force a case
to remain in a U.S. court, at the expense of U.S. taxpayers and to
the potential prejudice to the efficiency of the court and to other
U.S. litigants, than a foreign court might be when confronted with
a case previously dismissed in the United States on grounds of
forum non conveniens. Moreover, to the extent that a U.S. court
might perceive that there is reason to believe that Latin American
states were encouraged to try to force cases to remain in U.S.
courts by U.S. lawyers eager for the business, there might be even
more reason to resist. While blocking statutes of course dramatize
the issue, the underlying problem is the same whether the resis-
tance to hearing cases dismissed on grounds of forum non con-
veniens results from a specific blocking statute"° or from the
creative interpretations of existing jurisdictional principles so
ably presented and analyzed here."
The underlying question is whether U.S. courts will accept a
situation in which foreign states can in effect control the caseload
in U.S. courts by refusing to provide alternative fora for cases dis-
missed in the United States. This is not the ordinary question
regarding the availability of alternative fora posed in a forum non
conveniens inquiry. The blocking statutes and creative interpreta-
tions described here present a new situation, in which foreign
jurisdiction initially would have been available and is now lacking
because, or primarily because, of a forum non conveniens dismis-
sal in the United States. A U.S. court would, in my view, be on
solid ground in refusing to yield to such an obvious attempt by a
foreign state and its courts to control access to courts in the
United States.
What then? Needless to say, in any given case in which the
U.S. court dismisses the case anyway, and in which the foreign
court refuses to hear the case, the plaintiff may well be denied any
remedy. 2 But there is no reason why the burden of alleviating
that situation should fall only on the United States and its courts.
Indeed, to the extent that the problem arises because a foreign
10. See Saint Dahl, supra note 1, app. at 47.
11. See Garro, supra note 1, at 70-78; Saint Dahl, supra note 1, at 35-36.
12. That is not necessarily the case. An attorney may be liable for malpractice for
advising a plaintiff to sue in the United States without considering the possibility of a
forum non conveniens dismissal in the United States notwithstanding blocking
statutes or similar rules overseas.
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state or court refuses to hear the case only, or primarily, because
of the forum non conveniens dismissal, it can be fairly maintained
that the primary responsibility for the problem rests with the for-
eign state. 3
It is evident that a more refined and rational dialogue
between judicial systems is needed. This is not easy. Judges do
not, and in my view should not, negotiate with their foreign coun-
terparts either directly or indirectly. But they can attempt to
learn and listen. One way is for judicial decisions to expressly
address the questions of system coordination that are posed in a
way that is likely to be understood by a foreign court addressing
the problem.
Scholars and practitioners can contribute to this process by
addressing those problems thoroughly and candidly as well. We
can begin by recognizing one basic point: however nicely rooted in
theory, doctrine, or pragmatism, flat refusals to accommodate the
doctrine of forum non conveniens will not solve the problem unless
U.S. courts and U.S. legislatures, over time, opt for total capitula-
tion. That I think is unlikely. And unwise.
Thank you.
13. Traditionally, forum non conveniens issues are raised by the defendant. A
foreign state may resort to the more subtle technique of attempting to discourage
forum non conveniens motions in the first place by imposing onerous burdens (such as
substantial bond) on a defendant who successfully sought a forum non conveniens
dismissal elsewhere. See Dominica Act No. 16 of 1997, Transnational Causes of
Action (Product Liability) Act 1997, excerpted in Saint Dahl, supra note 1, app. at 49,
and discussed in id. n.14. The same problem arises, but in a different form: the
question posed is whether a U.S. forum should raise the matter sui sponte where it
believes that the failure of the defendant to do so results from foreign efforts to force
the defendant to keep the litigation in U.S. courts contrary to the ordinary rules
governing access to U.S. courts. Should a U.S. court do so and dismiss on its own
motion, an attempt by a foreign state to impose a punitive effect on the defendant
would raise serious human rights questions under both municipal and international
law. In order to protect the defendant from such punitive action, it might be necessary
for the U.S. court to specify in its order of dismissal that the costs of any such punitive
effects on the defendant will be borne by the plaintiff. That, at the least, would create
a balance between the two jurisdictions: the virtue of the unseemly result would be
that it exposes the folly of attempts by one state to legislate in a manner designed to
control access to the courts of the other.
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